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In welfare states, collective saving has declined to a persistently negative level, while 
reduced fertility and increasing longevity are leading to increasing pension liabilities. 
Actuarial neutrality across generations is presented as a benchmark for designing pension 
reforms to meet the challenges of population ageing. It is shown that this condition can be 
respected by a wide range of pension reforms, with very different consequences for public 
finance target setting. The rules for public pensions in national accounting are also 
discussed. Finally, the combined effects of population ageing and public pension rules on 
national saving are discussed. 
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  21.  Introduction 
Government saving contributed to total national saving and growth in the European welfare 
states from the 1950s to the mid-1970s, but since then, has (on average) been negative 
(Figures 1.1 and 1.2). Fertility has declined steadily since the 1970s (Figure 1.3), while 
longevity has increased and is expected to continue to do so. Public pension systems, 
prescribing Defined Benefits (DB) and financed from current contributions on a pure Pay-
As-You-Go (PAYG) basis, were established in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
These facts can be interpreted to mean that the generation working from the 1950s to the 
mid 1970s saved collectively, thereby contributing to economic growth both for themselves 
and for future generations. They also established a public pension system, thereby 
extracting some of the increased wealth for themselves during retirement. The generation 
working from the mid-1970s to the present day, on the contrary, reduced collective saving 
to a persistently negative level. They also reduced fertility below replacement, hence 
leaving a continuously declining working age population to pay for their pensions. 
Furthermore, their increased longevity means that, for any given retirement age, they will 
enjoy longer time in retirement. All this has led, not only to an increase in explicit 
government debt, but also to an increase in future pension liabilities to be covered from 
increased pension contributions or taxes to be paid by future generations. It is also obvious 
from the statistics that this increase in government debt (explicit and implicit) has not been 
compensated for by increased private saving. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse public pensions under population ageing and present 
a framework for designing pension reforms. The formal analysis in Chapter 2 is made as 
simple as possible to deal with the intergenerational aspects highlighted here: people in 
each generation are homogenous, all work, give birth to the next generation and enjoy 
retirement; successive generations differ with respect to fertility and longevity; pension 
rights are assumed to be determined by earnings, i.e. accrued by working and paying 
contributions and indexed to wage rate.
1 Chapter 2 first describes the dynamics over 
successive generations of a public pension system under population ageing. Secondly, 
actuarial neutrality across generations is defined. It shows that this condition can be 
respected by a wide range of pension reforms under population ageing, with drastically 
different mandatory system sizes, potentially shared management between the public and 
private sectors, and consequently, with very different effects on government finances. 
Chapter 3 discusses the rules for public pensions in national accounting, including 
proposals to revise them to cover pension liabilities more systematically than hitherto. 
Public finance target setting under alternative pension reforms and national accounting 
rules is also analysed. 
Chapter 4 illustrates the results with simulations using yearly stylised data. 
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1  The analysis could also be interpreted to cover flat rate pensions, in which case accrued pension by a 
generation is replaced by the future (expected) average pension of a generation as a percentage of average 
wage at the time of retirement. Under a flat rate system there is no link between pension and contributions 
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*    number of children by birth year of the mother, 1940-1965, 
** number of births in a given year per number of women, weighted by age-specific fertility rates of  the 
respective calendar year, 1970-2001. 
The two times scales overlap by 30 years reflecting the average childbearing age. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the public pension rules and public finance targets under population 
ageing on national saving. The main messages are that population ageing (by definition a 
transition to the new population age structure) has drastically differing effects on saving 
under different pension system rules. The perspective is also extended to comments on the 
controversy regarding private retirement accounts for the US Social Security, while 
asserting that the challenges facing the relatively generous pension systems in Europe 
dwarf those in the US.  
Chapter 6 concludes with suggestions for further work. 
 
2.  The principle of actuarial neutrality across generations extended to public pensions 
Notations and key concepts for a public pension system 
A simplest possible 3-period model is used to analyse what happens to pensions under an ageing 
population and to provide a framework for designing pension reforms.  
The population is composed of children (E), workers (L) and retirees (R). Each of these 
phases of an individual’s life is, for the purpose of managing the mathematics, set to be of 
equal length, which is set as the unit period: 
(1)  .  2 1 + + = = t t t R L E
  5To keep a rough correspondence with real life, the unit period is best considered to last 30 
years: this is currently the average childbearing age of women, and also, by chance, roughly 
the difference between the average age of a pensioner (70) and that of a worker (40). 
Parameter  f expresses the number of children per worker (assuming f<1 means that L 
decreases at a rate of 1-f): 
(2)  .  t t t L f E =
The assumed pension system delivers pensions accrued at a specified rate of the wage by 
working and paying pension contributions. Pensions in payment are indexed to the nominal 
wage rate, wt, assumed to be uniform for all.  
Pension per retiree for the unit period, as a percentage of unit wage, is  
(3)  st = σtπt-1,  
where πt-1 is the accrual rate valid for period t-1 workers determining their pension as a 
percentage of unit wage in the next period when retired, and σt is a scale factor which, 
firstly, takes into account that in the formal analysis we artificially assume that the 
period at work and in retirement are of equal length; for example, if in reality the 
former is 40 years and the latter 17, then σt is 0.425 (= 17/40). Secondly, an increase in 
longevity, assuming a constant retirement age, can be introduced by assuming an 
increase in σt: if people work for 40 years and longevity increases by six years, then σt 
increases to 0.575 (= 23/40); assuming, for example, an accrual rate of 1.5% per annum, 
gives πt-1 = 0.6 and st = 0.255 in the former case and 0.345 in the latter. 
To construct a case which is more general than a pure PAYG system, we allow that the 
system may have financial reserves, At (which can be negative). The interest rate is 
assumed to be uniform and a fixed margin, d, above the increase in the wage bill, which 
represents the scale of the economy. Thus, the interest factor ρt can be expressed as 
(4)     ρt = (wt/wt-1)(Lt/Lt-1)(1+d). 
The assumption of a fixed interest margin is a conventional one and leads in the present 
analysis to neat results; the implications of a variable d will be discussed further below.  
Implicit pension debt (IPDt) is defined as the present value of next period pensions accrued in 
period t: 








R w s IPD ρ .  
Degree of funding, zt, is defined as the ratio of financial reserves At to IPDt: 




A z = . 
The contribution rate in each period t is ct. System revenue includes pension contributions 
and interest on its assets, and pensions are the only expenditure item. Thus, budget balance 
equation for any period t reads as 
(7)  .  1 1 − − t t t t t t t t t t ) 1 ( − + = − + A A R w s A L w c ρ
  6Substituting from the population dynamics equations (1) and (2), pension accrual equation (3) 
and equations (4)-(5) for the definitions, the contribution rate ct can be expressed as 
(8) 
) 1 (
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This equation shows how the contribution rate is related to fertility that determines the ratio 
of retirees and workers in each unit period, pensions determined by the accrual rate and the 
ratio between time at work and in retirement (st = σtπt-1,), the interest rate margin over the 
wage bill growth (d), and the degree of funding both in the past and in the current period. 
The extreme case of full funding comes out by setting zt to 1 for the first period: the 
contribution rate is then equal to the present value of pension in the next period, and the 
system remains fully funded as long as this rule is followed.  
The elementary case of pure PAYG system is derived by setting zt to zero for all t: the 
contribution rate is then equal to the ratio of unit pension to unit wage divided by the 
relative number of retirees to workers that is determined by past fertility of the retired 
generation. 
Pure PAYG pension systems (or more generally, less-than-fully-funded ones) emerge as 
some age cohorts receive pensions under a Defined Benefit rule (DB) having contributed 
less than the capitalised value of what they will receive, thus, in general, having paid no 
contributions at all or receiving on their contributions a return higher than the market rate 
of interest. In this case, later on, contributions need to be increased to cover the expenditure 
under the given benefit rule. As the system matures, workers as contributors will have to 
pay in contributions that exceed the present value of their own future pensions. This excess 
is called implicit tax (ITt).  Expressed as a proportion of the wage bill, implicit tax rate, taxt 
can be written as    










t t + − − − = +
−
− . 
Under pure PAYG the implicit tax is negative for the first generation by the full amount of 
their pensions. Later, it is positive for all future generations taken together, but it is 
important to note from equation (9) that it can be negative for a particular generation if its 
longevity is sufficiently increased and/or fertility decreased as compared to the previous 
generation.  
Internal rate of return in the pension system in period t, it, is defined as the rate of return on 





















































In general, the result depends on all past and future demographic and pension system 
parameters and the interest rate margin.  
Under full funding (z always equal to 1) equation (9) gives zero for implicit tax and 
equation (10) gives the market rate as the rate of return.  
  7In the particular case of pure PAYG the result for internal rate of return is 
(10)’   1

























Thus, under a pure PAYG system the internal rate of return depends on the change in 
longevity, but not on the fertility of the generation in question; as a consequence, if ft<ft-1, 
the next generation(s) will have to pay higher contributions for the same benefits, thus, the 
internal rate of return for them will fall. Note also that the unit wage increase and fertility in 
the previous period determine the growth of the wage bill. Thus, equation (10)’ shows that 
the famous result by Samuelson (1958) that, under a pure PAYG system, the internal rate of 
return is equal to the wage bill growth, is valid not only under stable population structure 
(as he originally presented it) but also if longevity is constant (or more generally, if st+1=st 
i.e. if the accrual rate is reduced to neutralise the effect of longevity increase on pension 
expenditure).
2 
Actuarial neutrality extended to public less-than-fully-funded pensions 
For privately managed pension insurance, actuarial neutrality means that the present value 
of (expected) future pension entitlements equals the present value of contributions. Such 
contracts establish a fully funded pension system, either voluntary or mandatory by law. 
The implicit tax is zero and rate of return is equal to the market rate. 
If a pure PAYG pension system is fully matured with a fixed accrual rate, and the 
demographic structure is stable due to constant fertility and longevity, all current and future 
generations pay the same contribution rate and receive the same benefits as a percentage of 
unit wage in each period. This arrangement can be regarded as neutral across generations in 
the sense that all succeeding generations equally share the burden of past not-fully-funded 
pensions and cover the capital value of their own pensions. 
The reference to the case of stable population structure is made only to help to define the 
concepts. Interesting policy relevant issues arise only when the analysis is extended to a 
less-than-fully-funded public pension system under population ageing which is, by 
definition, a change in the age structure as fertility declines and affects the number of 
workers in the next period and/or longevity increases changing the ratio of time in 
retirement/at work (for a given retirement age).  
It is instructive to note that the burden of explicit public debt and implicit pension debt are 
parallel. As Diamond and Orszag (2004, pp. 37-38) put it, explicit public debt reflects the 
accumulated difference between the spending and revenue from the beginning of the nation 
to the present, and in parallel, under the public pension system, implicit pension debt 
reflects the accumulated difference between pension benefits for and contributions paid by 
previous and current generations. Both require that taxes (including pension contributions) 
are higher than in the case where expenditure was covered by revenue and pension benefits 
were pre-financed when rights were accrued (i.e. fully funded). 
In the present context, looking only partially into the public pension system, explicit public 
debt does not exist. Note, however, that partial funding means that the public sector, via the 
pension system, holds financial assets, thus a negative component of public debt. Assuming 
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2    The concepts of IPD, implicit tax and internal rate of return for pure PAYG systems are worked out, for 
example, by Uebelmesser (2004). Above, their definitions and derivations are more general, as any degree 
of funding is allowed for. a fixed interest rate margin over the rate of growth of the economy, the rule that extends 
actuarial neutrality to any cases where the demographic structure or pension system 
parameters change is that total public debt, i.e. IPD minus financial assets of the system, 
related to the scale of the economy, remains constant. Here, the scale factor is the wage bill. 















A IPD . 
Inserting this into equation (8) gives the contribution rate that respects actuarial neutrality, 
c
a
t, expressed in two alternative ways  
(12)  .






































The first expression gives c
a
t  as a function of the demographic and pension system 
parameters and the interest rate margin over wage bill growth. The second expression gives 
it as the sum of the implicit tax in this particular case and IPD as a percentage of wage bill 
in the period in question (the latter representing the newly acquired pension rights).  
 
3. Public finance targets under actuarial neutrality and alternative accounting rules  
Fiscal targets under actuarial neutrality and current national accounting  
A pure PAYG system is, by definition, always in financial balance in terms of conventional 
accounting, though this platitude is not very helpful for understanding the economic and 
political issues at stake when population ageing puts pressure on the pension system and 
necessitates changes to its rules.  
It is first useful to spell out what actuarial neutrality implies for financial assets (or debt) 
and budget balance. Denoting financial assets, At, as a proportion of the wage bill by qt, i.e. 




A q =  
and substituting to (12) gives (14), the change in qt under actuarial neutrality, expressed in 

































q q . 
Denoting the rate of growth of the wage bill by gt, i.e. 








we can express the conventionally defined budget balance under actuarial neutrality, B
a
t, as 
a percentage of the wage bill, b
a
t, as 


















































  9The last term gives the budget balance in a steady state where the demographic factors, 
pension system parameters and the interest margin d are constant and the first two terms 
therefore cancel each other out.  
Under population ageing and changes in pension system parameters, actuarial neutrality 
implies, as expressed in equation (14), that the increase in financial assets/wage bill ratio 
(qt) is equal to the increase in IPD/wage bill ratio. Note that this increase does not depend 
on the past value of qt and that this is valid for any degree of funding, including a fully 
funded system. The intuitive explanation is that people need to contribute more into the 
fund as longer life expectancy increases the capital value of pension required for any given 
replacement rate and as the rate of return falls (as the decrease in fertility causes a decline 
in the number of workers). In this way, a fully funded system is equally exposed to 
population ageing as any other system, and the increase in qt is the same as in any other 
case complying with actuarial neutrality. 
Thus, in general, according to (14), under ageing population and actuarial neutrality, the 
ratio of financial assets to wage bill increases; for example, the system moves from pure 
PAYG to partial funding. This is valid unless generosity of pensions is sufficiently reduced. 


















If this condition is valid, the contribution rate is constant. Measured this way, the size of the 
pension system remains unchanged, while generosity measured by the replacement rate 
adjusts downwards.
3   
The result in equation (14) helps to clarify the issue of ‘double burden’, often referred to 
with regard to moving to (partial) funding of public pensions: actual neutrality, without 
adequately decreasing the replacement rate and/or increasing the retirement age will require 
a move to partial funding. Thus, there is not necessarily any excessive ‘double burden’ for 
the current generation of workers even if the system moves to partial funding, while 
actuarial neutrality can be understood to determine a threshold beyond which pension 
contributions (or taxes) become excessive. 
Note that these equations do not in any way determine the future size of the public pension 
system, i.e. the level of benefits in period t+1 and onwards. They only give an actuarially 
neutral set of pension system parameters (accrual rate and contribution rate) under each set 
of demographic parameters. Moreover, actuarial neutrality is not presented here as an 
ultimate norm for public finance targets, but as a useful benchmark only. It does not bring 
into question the legacy of IPD from the past but rather recognises it as a burden to be 
shared equally between the current and all future generations. This is not to deny that 
reasons might well exist to depart from actuarial neutrality and share this burden 
differently, but the present framework merely provides a tool for arguing about such 
options. Note however, that the approach here directly challenges the view that 
continuation of a pure PAYG public pensions should be taken for granted. Equation (17) 
above shows that, under pure PAYG, actuarial neutrality is respected only if the benefits 
are sufficiently reduced. As this might, under population ageing, be in conflict with 
adequacy, especially if a significant increase in retirement age is not envisaged, a departure 
from pure PAYG might be justified. 
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3  The results above reiterate those in Oksanen (2004). Sinn (2000) gave the inspiration to look into the 
arguments for moving to partial funding under population ageing. The rule of actuarial neutrality can also be compared with Musgrave’s (1986) ‘fixed 
relative position’ rule for determining a fair pension formula, referred to in recent 
discussion, e.g. by Esping-Andersen et al. (2002). It means that pensions under a pure 
PAYG system are indexed to the wage rate after pension contributions. It is true that this 
Musgrave rule, like the rule of actuarial neutrality above, distributes the benefits of an 
exogenous change in productivity of labour equally between current workers and retirees 
through the wage index. However, it deviates from actuarial neutrality and leads under 
population ageing to an increasing burden for future generations. This could be most simply 
proven with a case where fertility decreases and longevity increases permanently: the first 
generation with the new demographic characteristics will have paid less for the same 
benefits than the similar generations which follow.
4, 5  
Finally, actuarial neutrality as developed here gives a direct input for setting public finance 
targets also for a more general case with legacy of explicit public debt. The increase in 
pension fund assets from equation (14) should enter as a target for the reduction of the net 
public debt ratio, and the budget balance from equation (16) should be added to the 
(negative) budget balance target that would keep the net debt ratio constant. This type of 
framework for setting public finance targets, which consistently integrates the public 
pension system to the rest of government finances, is indispensable for any pension 
financing rules - prescribing actuarial neutrality or other principles - to have their intended 
effects (for further comments, see Section 5 below). 
One qualification should be made here: expressing actuarial neutrality as the fixed target 
for total government debt requires the assumption that the interest rate is at a fixed margin 
(d) above the growth rate of the economy. A simple example explains that this has to be 
modified if d changes: if a pure PAYG pension system is mature and population age 
structure is stable, all generations pay the same contribution and receive the same benefits. 
However, if d increases (decreases), IPD decreases (increases), and therefore, the target for 
total government debt has to be correspondingly revised. This is valid for all other cases 
under population ageing and pension reforms. To set fiscal targets, it is therefore advisable 
to first work with the assumption of a fixed d and to treat the consequences of its possible 
changes separately. Note that such consequences of an interest rate changes need to be 
tackled in many other exercises, including consistency of national accounting, where they 
produce capital gains and losses to be separately treated. A detailed analysis of these issues 
is beyond the present paper.
 6  
                                                 
4 Myles (2003) asserts that people who were advised in the 1960s not to have too many children in order not 
to overburden the earth should not be punished for their reduced fertility. This is beside the point here as the 
consequences of declined fertility on pension systems should be treated regardless of the underlying 
reasons. The right question is why the first generation with declined fertility should be treated more 
favourably than any hypothetical identical generation later. See also Schokkaert and Van Parijs (2003). 
5 Note that, in the simple framework above, parameter σt for the ratio between time at work and in retirement 
captures, in addition to increasing life expectancy, an increase in retirement age. This is applicable for 
describing the new steady state after such a change. However, the transitional effect of the rate of change in 
work force due to such a change is not contained in this simple framework. Thus, the equations above are 
fully applicable only under the assumption of a fixed retirement age. This issue will be further explored 
with the help of yearly data simulations below. 
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6   Clarification of the assumption on the interest rate can be very important in many applications. For 
example, interpreting the simulation results reported by Werding and Fenge (2004) for implicit taxes in 
selected OECD countries, it is useful to note that the expression for implicit tax under actuarial neutrality in 
equation (12) above states that the implicit taxes may increase not only due to an increase in total net debt 
but also due to an increase in the interest margin. Consequently, if the interest rate is assumed to be fixed 
and the rate of economic growth decreases, the interest margin increase induces an increase in implicit tax. 
Therefore, if the purpose of a simulation is to use implicit tax as a measure of the relative position of each 
generation, it is advisable to technically assume a fixed interest margin.  Actuarial accounting for public pensions 
The current System of National Accounts 1993 (SNA-93) and, in parallel, the European 
System of Accounts (ESA-95) neither recognise the implicit pension debt of public DB 
pension systems in the balance sheets nor the effects of its changes for budget balance. 
Thus, government commitments to future pensions (or changes therein) do not affect a 
government’s financial position at the time of making them. 
For companies, the national accounting rules currently recognise the pension obligations as 
employer liabilities only if those obligations are funded, i.e. if they are (fully or partially) 
matched by segregated assets. As the nature of this obligation does not qualitatively depend 
on the mode of meeting it, and as such liabilities considerably affect the value of a firm, the 
main existing company accounting standards require their recording, whether funded or 
not. For example, from 2005 at the latest, all listed companies in the European Union are 
required to record all their pension liabilities according to the International Accounting 
Standards provision IAS19.  
Since 2001 the international statistical community has prepared a revision of national 
accounting rules for pensions, aimed at (1) a rapprochement of the treatment of employer 
pension schemes in company accounts and in national accounts and (2) consistency of 
national accounting rules for all pensions in all sectors. In spring 2005, a consensus seems 
to emerge for recording as debt all employer pension liabilities, including those of 
government, regardless of whether segregated assets back them or not (see Statistics 
Department, IMF, 2004). This change alone would have a significant effect on government 
accounts. It is less clear whether and when national accounting rules would be revised so 
that all public pension liabilities (i.e. social security and social assistance) would be treated 
as public debt, the main reason being the difficulty in estimating government IPD as it is 
often open to interpretation and is sensitive to small changes in assumptions (future interest 
rate, for example). Therefore, it is more likely that, at least for the time being, estimates for 
government IPD will be presented separately, outside the main body of government 
statistics, thereby providing statistics to be used for specific purposes without effecting 
daily monitoring of public finances (de Rougemont, 2003, OECD Statistics Directorate, 
2004, and Lequiller, 2005; also Oksanen, 2005). Whether public pension liabilities are 
eventually recorded in core accounts or not, certain conceptual issues must nonetheless be 
resolved to create a consistent set of accounting rules.
7 
                                                 
7  Beyond the general aim of harmonising corporations and government sector rules to a maximum, an 
important practical reason also exists: pension liabilities are sometimes shifted from a corporation to the 
government against a compensatory payment, often a lump-sum; this has recently happened in cases of 
public corporations, especially in the context of their reorganisation or privatisation. In such cases, the way 
these transactions are recorded has a crucial impact on government deficit, which is why Eurostat - the 
statistical arm of the European Commission - has in the recent past dealt with such cases in the context of 
validating government deficit figures. It came to the conclusion that the most consistent way under the 
current rules is to record the payment received by the government as government revenue, thus with a 
positive impact on government budget balance. The problem is that the pension liability taken over by the 
government as the counterpart of the lump sum received is not recorded in the accounts (Eurostat news 
release of 21 October, 2003, on cases with an unfunded company scheme, and that of 25 February, 2004, on 
the corresponding cases where it is funded). - Pension liabilities can also be transferred in the other 
direction, causing similar accountancy problems of consistency. These cases appear under partial 
privatisation of the public pension system, as a portion of pension contributions is diverted to a private 
sector managed pension fund, thus causing an immediate decrease in government revenue, while public 
pension expenditure decreases gradually. Eurostat has clarified the treatment of these cases and confirmed 
that such an operation has a negative impact on government budget balance (Eurostat news release of 2 
March, 2004). 
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The concepts defined above provide the required conceptual framework to extend actuarial 
accounting principles to public pensions, albeit recognising the main differences between 
company pension schemes and public social security pensions.  In the former, pension 
liability is a negative entry in the net worth of a corporation, whether segregated assets 
match this liability or not, and pension contributions, whether explicitly paid or imputed, 
are recorded as a financial transaction.  
A typical unfunded public pension scheme differs from a corporate one in that it is 
mandatory by law and its obligations are mostly covered by compulsory pension 
contributions or other taxes imposable by government. Alongside IPD, implicit tax inherent 
in public pure or less-than-fully-funded pension schemes is a key concept to arrive at 
consistent actuarial accounting for both corporations and governments. 
First, including IPD in the balance sheet as a component of public debt is a straightforward 
consequence of actuarial (or accrual) accounting. Possible financial assets, other than 
government bonds that are netted out under consolidated accounts, held by the public 
pension scheme are naturally a negative public debt entry. Thus, in the present simplified 
framework, net total public debt is IPDt-At (again, it would be easy to include here explicit 
public debt and the consequent primary surplus component to serve it). 
The corresponding budget balance under actuarial accounting, B(act)t, is negative of the 
change in this debt from the previous period. Expressing this as a percentage of wage bill, 
b(act)t, gives 



































act b , 
where gt is the wage bill growth rate. 
Under a steady state the first two terms cancel out, thus the budget balance is the product of 
the growth rate and the debt ratio. Importantly, this same result is valid for actuarial 
neutrality, as the first two terms are equal by definition, with an infinite number of possible 
combinations of pension system and demographic parameters. Therefore, fiscal targets 
under actuarial neutrality and accrual accounting become simple: constant total debt ratio 
and budget balance that is consistent with it (changing only with the change in the rate of 
growth of the economy, gt). 
For completeness of the accounting system it is most instructive to note that B(act)t as 
defined above can be decomposed, with the help of the concepts and equations above as 
follows: revenue includes the implicit tax and the return on assets and expenditure is the 
imputed interest payment on the contributions less implicit tax in the previous period. 
Contributions less implicit tax are treated as a financial transaction, giving rise to a 
government liability to the household sector, and the payment of pension as a depletion of 
this liability.  
Extending actuarial accounting to public pensions would allow for consistent treatment of 
pension liabilities of government and corporations and of the corresponding pension assets 
of households. It also draws attention to pension policies and warns of an increase in future 
expenditure already when the rights are accrued.  
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 The effect of the proposed explicit recording of public pension liabilities is naturally that 
the figures for total public debt increase to a new order of magnitude and that any policy 
rules linked to public debt and deficit need to be thoroughly reviewed. In European welfare 
states IPD of the pure PAYG systems might be 300% of GDP. If growth of nominal GDP is 
a moderate 3.3% per annum (see the illustrations below), and if a pension reform respecting 
actuarial neutrality prevents the net debt of the system from increasing as a percentage of 
GDP, deficit under actuarial accounting is nearly 10% of GDP! This follows from the sheer 
definition of budget balance: it is the change in net assets in nominal terms. As actuarial 
accounting displays a large stock of debt, its change is significant also in the case that the 
stock as a percentage of GDP is constant (which could be a benchmark for an economically 
balanced and acceptable scenario).  
A major problem in extending actuarial accounting to public pensions is that any changes in 
assumptions for estimating IPD which might become necessary threaten to distort regular 
monitoring of public finances for other purposes for which developments in the short term 
are relevant. 
 
4. Illustrations with stylised data 
In line with the 3-period model above the results here are illustrated with stylised yearly data. 
The gradual maturation of a pure PAYG system providing Defined Benefits is first described 
by assuming a stationary population (i.e. fertility is 2.1 per woman and longevity is constant). 
All people live 20 years as children, work for 40 years until the age of 60, and enjoy 
retirement for 17 years. Each year, workers earn pension rights equal to 1.5 percent of their 
salary, so that working for 40 years gives a 60 percent replacement rate. 
The real wage growth rate is assumed to be 1.75 percent per annum. Inflation is assumed at 
1.5 percent p.a. Interest rate is assumed to be uniform at 1.5 p.p. above the rate of change of 
the wage bill.
8  
To illustrate the gradual maturing of the pension system that takes 57 years, i.e. the full 
working life and retirement of a 20-year old member, it is assumed to be established in 
1920. The contribution rate in 1977 is 25.2% and the IPD 568% of the wage bill. 
Then, we first assume that fertility starts to decline in 1971 and gradually falls to 1.7 in 
2000. This is roughly the observed decline in Western Europe
9. From 2000 onwards it is 
assumed to be constant (this is roughly what is assumed for population projections). 
Secondly, longevity is assumed to increase by one year in every decade from 1990 to 2050. 
We want to express some of the key variables as percentages of GDP. For this, wage bill 
after pension contributions is set at 40% of GDP in 2000; for the future, it is set to decrease 
to allow for the increase in pension contributions. These simple assumptions imply a 
pension expenditure of 10.9% of GDP in 2000 and 15.3% in 2050. The former figure 
corresponds to the data in the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) report of 2001. The latter 
                                                 
8  This assumption means that real interest is first 3.3% and then declines to 2.6% along with the falling rate 
of growth. As for sensitivity of the results, for example, IPD is 1045% of wage bill under population ageing 
in the first scenario below, while it is 891% if interest rate differential were 1 percentage point higher. 
9  This refers to ‘completed fertility’ indicating the number of children of women who have passed fertile age. 
It is distinct from ‘total fertility’, which gives the ratio of births to women of fertile age. As the average age 
at which women give birth has recently increased, ‘total fertility’ has been lower than ‘completed fertility’. 
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 figure gives the full effect of population ageing under the parameters assumed here. It is 
higher than projected in the EPC report, which assumes various changes in pension systems 
and employment patterns.  
Figure 4.1 gives the IPD as a percentage of the wage bill for the stationary population, 
declined fertility and the combination of declined fertility and increasing longevity. The 
steady state under both of these population ageing factors is reached in 2050. Pension 
expenditure is then 43.1% and IPD 1045% of wage bill. 
Next, we display the effect of implementing actuarial neutrality from 2005 onwards, 
assuming first that the initial pension benefits are maintained (including retirement age at 
60), see Figure 4.2. The contribution rate is increased to cover the implicit tax set to serve 
the implicit debt accumulated by 2004 and the newly accrued rights (NAR/wb) from 2005 
onwards. In 2005 the contribution rate jumps well above pension expenditure as a 
percentage of wage bill (which would have determined the contribution rate if pure PAYG 
were continued). Actuarial neutrality distributes the burden of previously accumulated debt 
evenly across all current and future workers and makes them each pay the value of their 
own future pensions. The contribution rate increases to 39%. Under pure PAYG it would 
increase to 43.1%.  
Figure 4.2 also displays the annual IPD change and shows that it is well above 12% of GDP 
through the late 2020s, which indicates that under pure PAYG IPD/GDP is still increasing 
considerably. By definition, actuarial neutrality means that assets are accumulated to keep 
the total debt/GDP ratio at its 2004 level. Conventional budget balance peaks at 4.5% of 
GDP around 2020 and then adjusts to its steady state level of 2.3%. Assets/GDP ratio 
increases to 95% of GDP, which, by definition of actuarial neutrality, is the increase in the 
IPD/GDP ratio from 2004 to its steady state value. Budget deficit under actuarial 
accounting immediately reduces to its actuarially neutral level; note that the smooth 
decrease taking place after 2005 only stems from the decrease in the rate of growth of the 
economy as the total net debt/GDP ratio is constant.  
Significant accumulation of assets in the pension fund as such may not make this scenario 
grossly unrealistic as figures above 100% of GDP are found for quasi-mandatory systems 
in Denmark and the Netherlands, and privately managed pension provisions in the UK. 
What makes the scenario unrealistic is the huge increase in the contribution rate. However, 
this illustrates the cost of the assumed benefit rules, comprising of the replacement rate and 
retirement age. Distribution of this cost across generations should be seriously addressed 
and actuarial neutrality gives a useful benchmark.  
Actuarial neutrality across generations does not, however, prescribe the future size of the 
public pension system determined by pension accrual from now onwards. A simple 
illustration is given in Figure 4.3 where the accrual rate is assumed to have decreased from 
1.5% per annum to 1.125%, leading to a replacement rate decline to 45% after the full 
career of 40 years. Actuarial neutrality implies that the contribution rate jumps from 28.1% 
in 2004 to 30.5% in 2005 and then smoothly increases to 32.2%, determined by the 
demographic changes taking place. Over the transition, limited assets are first accumulated 
and then depleted. In the steady state total net debt is equal to IPD in 2004. Budget deficit 
under actuarial accounting is the same as in Figure 4.2 or in any other case respecting 
actuarial neutrality.  
  15Figure 4.1.  Implicit pension debt under alternative population scenarios 
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Figures 4.4 a-b illustrate an extreme case where actuarial neutrality is respected and the 
pension system is gradually scrapped by reducing the accrual rate to zero in 2005. From 
2005 onwards the workers pay a tax for serving the implicit debt, but this is the only 
revenue of the system. Pension expenditure gradually reduces and the system explicitly 
goes into debt. After the transition, lasting 63 years, the 2004 IPD of 311% of GDP has 
become explicit debt.  
Budget balance under current national accounting first reduces as pension contributions are 
suddenly reduced from 28.1% to 11.8%, and then the deficit increases further as the effects 
of the ongoing population ageing continue to increase pension expenditure until the 
opposite effect of the cessation pension rights accumulation sends pension expenditure to a 
decline. All these dynamic factors mean that the conventionally defined budget deficit 
reduces to its steady state value only after 63 years after the change. Again, budget deficit 
under actuarial accounting is the same as in the case above. 
 
  17Figure 4.4.  Actuarial neutrality from 2005 onwards, accrual rate zero  
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The same pattern of budget deficit under the two parallel accounting rules would recur 
under any newly determined accrual rates in between the cases in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. This 
would happen under a partial privatisation of the pension system by diverting part of the 
pension contributions to a newly established mandatory privately managed fully funded 
pillar and reducing the accrual rate in the public pillar consistently with actuarial neutrality. 
Note that a consistent reform requires that the implicit tax due to the past accumulation of 
IPD is maintained as public sector revenue, and the rest of initial contributions is shared 
between the public and private pillars consistently with the new accrual rate in the public 
pillar. Under an assumption of a uniform interest rate the total replacement rate is not 
affected by the establishment of a two-pillar system. 
Note also that the case in Figure 4.2 above where initial accrual rates are maintained and 
asset accumulation therefore takes place could be privatised up to a certain proportion 
without incurring debt: under an actuarially neutral reform, the assets would then 
accumulate in the privately managed system. This observation links the assessment of the 
merits of privatisation to the views about time consistency of economic policy. The 
question is, do people trust the public sector as manager of their pension assets? Various 
institutional arrangements - including involvement of labour market organisations - exist to 
draw a line between assets in the mandatory or quasi-mandatory pension system and 
government’s coffers.  
  19With regard to national accounting rules, it should be emphasised that actuarial accounting 
provides a robust base to cover a wide range of cases. Firstly, budget deficit under actuarial 
accounting gives the information about future pension expenditure when the pension rights 
are established. If this deficit is higher than what was actuarially neutral, future generations 
pay an increasing burden. Secondly, deficit under this definition is the same irrespective of 
a wide range of institutional arrangements. This is in contrast to the sensitivity of the deficit 
under current rules. The mandatory pension system is classified within government 
accounts if it provides defined benefits, even if partially funded, while a mandatory 
privately managed fully funded Defined Contribution (DC) system falls outside the 
government accounts. Institutional changes may therefore have a dramatic effect on 
government fiscal variables even in cases where the changes are actuarially neutral. 
Increasing retirement age 
In all scenarios above either contribution rate increases or replacement rate decreases 
significantly. The question of increasing the retirement age is therefore triggered. As stated 
in Chapter 2, the 3-period model is adequate to calculate new sets of parameters for the new 
steady state, but not for the transitional period. This is also valid for the simulations using 
yearly data as actuarial neutrality cannot be unambiguously defined for such cases. To 
understand why, it is useful to note that this would be possible only in an extreme case 
where people retire from the public less-than-fully-funded pension system but continue 
working and paying contributions to a fully funded system that might be mandatory or 
voluntary. This way they earn an addition to their replacement rate when they truly retire, 
but while continuing at work, they avoid paying the implicit tax to the basic public system.  
This may have some relevance for grey economy activities of retired people but it is hardly 
relevant for public system rules. However, it is common and reasonable to prescribe 
specific accrual rates for workers around and beyond the average retirement age to provide 
proper incentives to work longer.  
Figure 4.5 gives an example of such a scenario. The accrual rates for working at ages 60, 61 
and 62 are simply assumed to be 1.25%, 3% and 4.5%, and the retirement age to increase 
by three years, gradually, 0.3 years per year, i.e. over 12 years. The underlying idea is that 
the first one year increase might be possible without an increased accrual rate by tightening 
eligibility to disability pensions, but further increases require a noticeable compensation. 
As the purpose of the reform is to contain the increase in pension expenditure both in the 
short run and long run, it is also assumed that the accrual rate for the prime age workers is 
reduced from the initial 1.5% to 1.25% from 2005 onwards. These assumptions mean that 
after the full career of 43 years the replacement rate in the new steady state (after many 
decades) is 58.75%, i.e. just below the initial 60%.  
This case is just an example, but interestingly these assumptions lead in the steady state to 
an IPD as a percentage of the wage bill that is roughly the same as in 2004. Accumulation 
of assets resulting from the transitory decrease in expenditure due to the increase in 
retirement age, gradually increasing contribution rate and the new structure for accrual rates 
keep the size of the public system unchanged in the long run, measured by IPD as a 
percentage of wage bill. However, measured by the contribution rate the size expands: the 
contribution rate increases from 28.1% in 2004 to 32.4%, thus further increase in retirement 
age and/or reduction of accrual rate is needed to contain the increase in contributions.   
  20Proposal by Valdes-Prieto to securitize implicit tax and move instantaneously to full 
funding 
Valdes-Prieto (2005) advances a detailed proposal to securitize the implicit tax in the 
PAYG system, resulting not only in recording the IPD in the balance sheet of the public 
pension institution but also opening the possibility to trade a security that is closely linked 
to the rate of return on human capital. Although his blueprint could in principle be applied 
under defined benefit rules, his main motivation is to foster a pension reform that makes the 
system solvent under a specified contribution rate, and as a second step, insulate it from 
arbitrary political interference.  
For the first stage, he proposes a transition from a tradition DB system to a Notional 
Defined Contribution (NDC; or Notional Accounts, NA, system). In broad terms, a 
transition to NDC from a public DB system means that contributions are fixed, registered 
on notional individual accounts which receive an administratively fixed rate of interest, and 
the capitalised value at retirement is transformed into an annuity paid out as a pension.  
If the notional rate of interest is set as the rate of growth of the wage bill (which is the 
contribution base), and projections of life expectancy at retirement are continuously 
updated and correspond to the real outcomes, contribution revenue covers pension 
expenditure in the long run. However, this is not sufficient for financial stability (solvency) 
of the system. Revenue may in any given year be less (more) than pension expenditure due 
to a fall (increase) in participation rate, creating a deficit (surplus). If the interest rate is 
higher than wage bill growth, the system is financially unsustainable, unless the effect is by 
chance neutralised by another change. Therefore, an NDC system needs a specifically 
tailored balancing mechanism.
10  
Valdes-Prieto prescribes that the government creates “Covered Wage Bill” (CWB) bonds to 
restructure an NDC system (without financial assets). The right to collect the implicit tax 
under PAYG financed pensions is transferred from the government to the pension 
institution and this revenue is securitized into the CWB bonds, perpetuities held in the first 
place by the pension institution. Selling some of them to outside investors gives a daily 
valuation of these bonds. The financial rate of return earned by the pension institution is 
then used to determine the pensions to be paid out. This arrangement assures the financial 
balance of the scheme in every state of nature. 
An assessment of the merits of this proposal based on improved allocation of risk is beyond 
the present paper. Here, it is interesting to note that both the implicit tax and IPD would be 
made explicit and recorded in the accounts of the pension institution. The consequences for 
government finances would depend on the interpretation and possible revision of national 
accounts classification criteria. On the one hand the newly restructured public pension 
scheme would resemble social insurance where the pensions are determined by the market 
rate of return on CWB bonds that is unknown ex ante. This could mean under the current 
rules that the pension institution be classified outside government sector in insurance 
corporations and pension funds, together with privately managed fully funded (mandatory 
and voluntary) pension schemes. On the other hand, the right of the newly structured public 
pension scheme to collect the implicit tax could be considered a characteristic due to which 
it should be classified within the government sector. 
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10 The Swedish NDC system incorporates such an adjustment mechanism also because its basic internal rate 
of return was originally set as the change of average wage rather than wage bill (see Settergren, 2001). Be this as it may, this innovative proposal draws attention to basic features of public 
pension systems and the challenges of assuring their solvency. As Valdes-Prieto 
emphasises, his proposal can only be applied as a further step to a pension scheme that is 
solvent at the reform date. The present paper provides a framework for specifying a wide 
range of pension reforms that respect actuarial neutrality across generations and thereby 
provide a basis for solvency under fixed parameters.  
 
5. Implications for government finances and national saving 
Above, we have defined actuarial neutrality as a benchmark under which total public debt 
as a percentage of GDP is constant, and shown that, apart from a special case, the public 
pension system needs to depart from a pure PAYG. Importantly, a wide range of pension 
system rules fulfil this condition. Then, in general, explicit public debt - net of financial 
assets - may decrease (as the pension system moves to partial funding), stay constant or 
increase, depending on the future size of the public system. Note also that a reform may 
shift part of the mandatory system to the private sector, depending on the pension system 
and national accounting rules. Therefore, as said in Section 3 above, it is indispensable that 
the pension system and the rest of government finances are covered under an integrated 
framework when designing pension system rules and setting targets for public finances as a 
whole.  
It is not self-evident that this is the case in practise. For example, if the public pension 
system is set to move to partial funding, but at the same time the target for government 
budget balance, as currently defined in national accounts, is independently set at a fixed 
number, then the surplus in pension fund would leak out as a consequent increase in deficit 
in the rest of government finances. Accumulation of funds for future pensions would then 
not serve its purpose.  
Measuring this possible leakage, Bosworth and Burtless (2004) find that there was no 
leakage in the case of US States’ budgets, while in 13 OECD counties over the period 
1970-2000 slightly more than half seems to have leaked out. The authors conclude that 
preventing the leakage requires separating public pension funds from the rest of 
government finances. In their sample the leakage was smallest in Finland. This supports the 
view that a separate public pension system management structure, as in Finland, helps to 
achieve the intended effects of partial pre-funding of public pensions. However, this may 
not be sufficient in cases where the pension system is classified within the general 
government sector, as it is in Finland, but targets for general government must also be set 
so that the surplus and asset accumulation in the public pension fund separately enter into 
the targets for budget balance and net debt reduction.
11  
Thus, setting the targets for government budget balance and net debt in line with the 
intended purposes of a pension reform is manageable under the current national accounting 
rules, provided that the key concepts are clarified and the required data is available. This 
can also be extended to possible pre-saving for future increases in other population ageing 
                                                 
11 Note that the mandatory earning-related pensions in Finland basically follow Defined Benefit rules and the 
system therefore, despite being managed by specially assigned institutions, is classified in the general 
government sector under current national accounting rules.  
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 related public expenditure items like health care expenditure (for an application, see 
Oksanen, 2003). 
Note also that if an appropriate rule for budget balance is followed, it does not matter 
whether the public pension fund invests in government bonds or in other assets. The 
resulting surplus will mean that explicit net public debt is decreased. If the budget balance 
target is set aside and a debt target is used instead, the target needs to be defined for explicit 
net debt as gross public debt will depend on the division of public pension fund investment 
between government bonds and assets issued by the private sector. Thus, if appropriate 
rules are followed, moving to partial funding as such does not require that the funds be 
invested in private equity, nor that management of these funds be privatised. These issues 
need to be decided on other grounds. 
As compared to using the current national accounting concepts, the advantage of moving to 
actuarial accounting in setting fiscal targets is that the future pension expenditures, through 
the estimated IPD, possible pension fund assets and public debt, are inevitably incorporated 
into a consistent framework. Specifically, the newly defined budget balance and total 
explicit and implicit debt as a percentage of GDP are equal under all reform options that 
fulfil actuarial neutrality across generations. Correspondingly, a change in total debt ratio 
indicates a divergence from actuarial neutrality, whether it follows from pension system 
rules or from borrowing for public consumption. This allows examination of all relevant 
factors under an integrated framework, and definition of appropriate action should 
correction be required.  
With regard to applications, though the framework as developed above is relatively robust, 
the assumption of a fixed interest rate margin should be noted. This is not a serious 
limitation, but rather a technical assumption that can be removed if necessary. A slightly 
more complicated issue is raised by the assumption of a fixed retirement age required for 
the most straightforward results: the initial (average) retirement age might be badly 
distorted (as the statutory retirement age was fixed long ago when longevity was lower). 
Therefore, even if it is probably necessary to set a higher accrual rate for later years at 
work, a fully actuarially neutral treatment might not be necessary or desirable. In this case 
people would participate in serving the implicit debt, not only by paying the implicit tax as 
part of their regular pension contributions, but also by accepting to work longer even if an 
additional implicit tax is due on these extra years at work too. Thus, setting fiscal targets is 
complicated by an increase in retirement age. This is important to note as retirement 
increase must be included in any successful pension reform in European welfare states. The 
framework above can be used to give approximate guidance for such more complicated 
cases.  
Pension reforms and total saving 
Looking at pension reforms in a partial analysis, as above, without doubt opens the way for 
discussing the purpose of public pensions and new options to achieve them. However, the 
effects on the real economy also depend on the behaviour of the private sector, and these 
effects may crucially affect the choice between alternative reforms.   
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The extreme case at a high level of abstraction, the so-called Ricardian equivalence - 
revived by Barro (1974) – provides a starting point: though a lifetime is finite, assuming 
that people give the same weight to their own discounted utility and that of their 
descendents, they behave as if it were infinite; therefore, under perfect markets, an increase 
in government debt is matched by an increase in private saving as people want to leave to 
their heirs an quantity of wealth that does not depend on its composition with regard to assets and liabilities, including future taxes to serve public debt. This implies, for example, 
that introduction of a pure PAYG pension system would not affect total saving (and 
therefore no real economy variables) as people would accumulate a stock of private saving 
that matches government IPD. More generally, whatever happens to government debt, 
whether explicit or implicit, does not have any real effects.  
This theorem is as good as its assumptions. It has served to challenge other extreme views 
on the effects of government intervention, and as its implications have not been considered 
to be fully plausible, it has also guided further research to relax one or another of its 
assumptions. 
Maintaining the assumption of perfect markets, one obvious alternative assumption is that 
people plan their saving over their own lifetime and that they do not leave bequests, or at 
least the bequests are not fully affected by government finances. Then, not only deficit 
spending by the government reduces total saving, but also introduction of a pure PAYG 
pension system reduces private saving as people save less for their own retirement. 
Incidentally, Feldstein (2005a) looks back on his time as a graduate student in the 1960s 
and remembers how he became interested in pensions, having noted that Friedman’s and 
Modigliani’s work on life cycle saving completely ignored their role even though they had 
become the major source of retiree income.  
The inference highlighted in the present paper is that under given Defined Benefit pensions, 
population ageing leads to an expansion of the pension system that should be understood to 
have the same effect on private saving as the original introduction of a pure PAYG system. 
Total public debt, i.e. explicit debt and IPD (as a proportion of the scale of the economy) is 
a most relevant measure of public intervention. Even if explicit net public debt is constant, 
yet the benefit rules are maintained under a pure PAYG system under population ageing, 
total public debt increases, which leads to a negative effect on total saving.  
What then will happen to saving under population ageing and actuarially neutral pension 
system rules? Assume that initially a public pension system provides some level of 
retirement income but less than what people need under an exogenously determined 
retirement age and a given target for consumption at retirement. Then, under population 
ageing, saving must increase as people will spend longer time in retirement and the rate of 
interest is lower due to declined rate of economic growth. This increase is the same under 
any actuarially neutral pension system rules as the level of future pensions only determines 
the division of saving between mandatory and voluntary.  
This positive effect on saving is only transitional. In the new steady state with a stable 
population age structure the saving rate may, under the assumptions above, be lower than 
initially, i.e. before the long process of population ageing started. However, the capital-
output ratio (or capital-labour ratio) is higher than initially – the declined rate of growth of 
the economy due to the shrinking labour force explains that net saving rate which keeps the 
capital-output ratio at its new higher constant level is lower than initially (this is also 
consistent with the observation that the number of pensioners who dissave to that of 
workers who save is now higher than initially).  
However, in the first phase of the transition, with no further government intervention, (i.e. 
installing actuarially neutral pension system rules), workers’ saving rate must increase as 
their targeted pension capital increases. This effect is important because, even if 
transitional, it may last for a couple of decades because the underlying process of 
population ageing is so slow, taking some two to three generations depending on the initial 
  24impulse triggering it. For this reason, an analysis confined to a comparison of alternative 
steady states is inadequate, and potentially misleading.  
These comments are relevant for assessing the empirical studies on the effect of population 
ageing on private and total saving (see e.g. Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén, 2000, and 
Samwick, 2000; for a review see McMorrow and Röger, 2004). These studies normally 
build on the life-cycle saving models, but fail to address the time factor consistently with 
the underlying theory: it takes 30 years for an average worker (age 40) to become an 
average pensioner (age 70); therefore, his/her savings decisions will depend not on what the 
population age structure is nor what pensions of current pensioners are now, but on what he 
expects them to be 30 years hence. Nor does observing the characteristics of the public 
pension system today with regard to degree of funding, for example, give an adequate 
picture, as while the degree of funding might remain at zero, pension system generosity 
may change significantly. Therefore, any empirical study requires a careful specification of 
pension system rules and their changes in order to obtain useful results on the effect of 
population ageing on saving under alternative pension system rules.
12  
The controversy over mandatory private pension accounts in the US 
The framework in the present paper can be used for commenting on the heated debate on 
US Social Security pensions. Feldstein (2005a and 2005b) maintains that shifting a fraction 
(1.5% of wages) of mandatory pension contributions to newly created private accounts, and 
topping this with a similar additional contribution would provide benefits that would 
exceed those foreseen under the current rules, thus eliminating any need to increase the 
contributions otherwise foreseen, so that every generation would gain. In short, his 
argument is that the pension system is an appropriate vehicle for increasing aggregate 
saving which is currently lower than optimal, and that replacing part of the tax on wages by 
mandatory pension savings partly eliminates the harmful distortion of labour supply. 
It should be observed that Feldstein’s arguments, if valid, apply equally well under stable 
population structure as under population ageing. Also, by implication, under his 
assumptions, establishing a pure PAYG pension system (as with issuing public debt for 
consumption) cause a net loss over all generations, deviating from the analysis above that 
equates the gain to one generation to the cost to be borne by all future generations together.  
The camp opposing private accounts is not convinced of their merits as they assert that the 
alleged positive effects can also be achieved by other means, for example, by removing 
distortions in labour and capital markets and thereby enhancing production and total saving. 
For them, financial sustainability of the pension system can be assured with reforms under 
the current institutional structure. Diamond and Orszag (2004 and 2005) present such a 
detailed plan that includes roughly constant average benefits and a moderate contribution 
rate increase. 
In assessing the proposals of both camps we should first note that the unanimous desire to 
maintain the average replacement rates roughly at the current level of 30%; in fact, 
Feldstein’s proposal foresees increasing total benefits, helping to convince the audience that 
it is advantageous to everybody. Maintaining the benefit level might be an advisable base 
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12 In a recent overlapping generations (OLG) model based simulation exercise Saarenheimo (2005) recognises 
the positive effect of population ageing on saving, emphasises in the present paper, stemming from the 
increase in saving by prime age workers as they need to plan for longer retirement than before. He therefore 
shows results where, in the first place, saving increases, real interest rates decrease and the ‘financial 
market meltdown’ feared by some other authors does not happen. As discussed above, this increase in 
saving shows up in private or public sector depending on public pension system rules.  line for the US as it is roughly half the level in European welfare states, and cuts would 
lead to poverty among the elderly population. Thus, the necessary adjustments need to be 
made in contribution rates and retirement age. Secondly, we should note that the 
demographic development is less worrying in the US, mainly due to the higher fertility rate.  
A rough back of an envelope calculation shows that the principle of actuarial neutrality 
across generations as developed above would lead after two generations, to a 25% of GDP 
increase in the Trust Fund, on top of its current level of about 10% of GDP. The Diamond- 
Orszag plan implies a temporary increase in the Trust Fund (to smooth out the effects of the 
baby boom generation) and a consequent levelling off to its current level as a percentage of 
GDP. Feldstein’s proposal implies that capital on the mandatory private retirement accounts 
would reach 100% of GDP in 2060. This seems excessive, as it may put a grater burden on 
the transition generation than on others. However, it is not possible to take a firm view on 
this as his plan is based on the arguments about improved efficiency, and thereby gains to 
all generations.  
Here, we do not want to take a view on the possible efficiency gains from introducing 
private accounts into the US system. As for the Diamond-Orszag proposal, most 
importantly, it assures financial sustainability of a system that provides benefits at roughly 
current level. From the perspective of burden sharing across generations, it seems that the 
increase in contribution rate could be slightly frontloaded, leading to an increased Trust 
Fund in the long run, though a more refined view of such an adjustment would require 
examination of other related factors.  
Old Europe is different 
In European welfare states the public pension systems currently provide benefits with 
double the generosity of that in the US, and population ageing will drastically shift the 
terms under which they can be financed. Respecting the accrued rights, a balanced package 
for future probably includes a reduction in benefit level and an increase in retirement age, 
but as these probably don’t lead to actuarial neutrality, an increase in contribution rate and 
thereby a move to some degree of partial funding might also be included. Partial funding of 
the mandatory pension system should then lead to a reduction of public net debt, or to 
establishing a separate fully funded, possibly private sector managed second pillar. Both 
solutions lead under plausible assumptions to an increase in total saving. This conclusion 
can be reached from relatively simple arguments, without entering into more complicated 
and controversial ones about market distortions and efficiency gains. 
Recalling that public pension systems, largely pure PAYG based, were established in the 
late 1950s or early 1960s in many European countries, we can infer that an extraordinary 
gain was paid to the first generation, which the future generations must pay for. However, 
referring back to Figures 1.1-1.3 above, a more complete judgement needs to be based on 
government finances as a whole: the workers in the 1950s through mid-1970s saved 
collectively as net saving of government was 2-3% of GDP in our sample of EU countries. 
This could have compensated for the negative effect on saving and growth that would 
otherwise have resulted from the introduction of generous public pensions. 
Since the mid-1970s, as pension systems approached maturity, the decline in fertility and 
increase in longevity induce, if pension generosity is preserved, a gain to the generation 
currently of working age that is similar to that for the first generation of retirees. This time, 
the difference is that government saving has declined and it is also hard to identify any 
other mechanism that would compensate for the increasing pension burden.  
  26This conclusion could, however, trigger an extension of the analysis to cover not only 
saving and investment into physical, but also into human capital. Parents could, for 
example, compensate to some extent for declined fertility by providing, both individually 
and collectively, an increased level of education to their children. By so doing they would 
pay for their future pensions - implicitly or explicitly linked to higher wages - and their 
children, as future workers, would repay the educational costs in the form of higher pension 
contributions. While this reasoning is plausible, it is probable that the increase in the level 
of education provided would only partly compensate for the observed decline in fertility so 
that maintaining the Defined Benefit rules under a pure PAYG would be actuarially neutral 
or otherwise justified. A careful quantitative assessment of the relevant factors is therefore 
necessary.  
 
6. Conclusions and suggestions for further work 
Perhaps the main motivation to present this relatively simple analysis of public PAYG 
systems is that people know very little about their functioning (see for example the survey 
results in Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini, 2001 and 2002, covering four major EU 
countries). People may have an idea as to the rights they have earned (or what earnings they 
think would be justified over their full career), but understanding their cost is probably a 
very weak point. Therefore, rather than entering into discussion on essential functions of 
pension systems such as risk sharing etc., the present paper has emphasised the link 
between benefits and costs and presented a simple framework to find an actuarially neutral 
division of costs across generations as population ageing takes place, i.e. successive 
generations are different with regard to their demographic characteristics.  
Implicit Pension Debt, alongside implicit tax, is a key concept to analysis of public pension 
systems. Estimating IPD is not an easy task as pension system rules may not be 
unambiguous, but an exercise to produce a range of estimates is not only useful for 
producing estimates to be used by experts but also to look in detail into the pension systems 
and their reform options. While estimates on IPD in EU and other OECD countries date 
from the early 1990s and are thus badly outdated (see Franco, Marino and Zotteri, 2005), 
long-term projections on public pension expenditure are now produced for most countries. 
Producing estimates for IPD would be based on the same data, with the refinement that the 
calculations would need to be made by age cohorts, a challenging but instructive task 
(Holzmann et al., 2004, gives estimates for middle income countries).  
Defining  actuarial neutrality across generations provides a framework for examining 
pension systems, notably to avoid any unintended increase in the pension burden. It is a 
benchmark that defines an infinite number of reform options that differ with respect to the 
future level of benefits and organisational features, such as sharing the management in a 
mandatory system between public authorities and privately managed pension funds. The 
criteria used to choose among these options boil down to the same issues as are relevant in 
the initial introduction of a public pension system: moral hazard and imperfections in the 
private annuities market, and paternalism towards those who are believed to be myopic. 
When considering reform to relatively generous public pension systems in European 
welfare states, it is plausible that the best option is a combination of more than one 
institutional arrangement, and their relative size should change under population ageing.   
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